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Pestana, the largest Portuguese hotel chain, celebrated in 2012 its fortieth 
anniversary. Its portfolio included forty-seven hotels under Pestana Hotels & Resorts 
brand in thirteen countries across Europe, Africa and America, besides the units it 
managed under Pousadas de Portugal. The company’s future plans for expansion 
focused especially on emerging destinations of South America and the traditional 
European markets. Pestana was present in several cities in South American countries 
and it had already few ongoing projects in Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The 
main question regarded Europe. Pestana was particularly interested in the Spanish 
market.  
The case study provides therefore an overview of the company as well as the 
tourism and hotel industry, with especial focus in Spain. The aim of this master 
dissertation is to conduct a strategic analysis of the Spanish market, identifying its 
trends, opportunities and threats, among others. Spain is one of the top destinations in 
the world but the financial downturn, the difficulties in obtaining credit and the fierce 
competition in the hotel industry, especially from the largest international chains, were 
some of the setbacks for entering into such country. On the other hand, some 
opportunities arose as the price some hotel establishments decreased, becoming 
potential acquisition targets for larger companies. In addition, other entry modes, like 
management contracts or franchising agreements that required lower capital 
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Over the years, the family owned Pestana Group proved itself as a strong player 
in the hotel and resort business. Celebrating in 2012 its fortieth anniversary, the 
Portuguese Group still had several plans to strengthen its position not only in the 
domestic market but also internationally, following some of the many opportunities in 
the tourism industry.   
José Roquette, manager at Pestana, explained the Group’s focus to a Portuguese 
magazine: 
“Today, we have two big lines of development – South American and 
European capitals – a strategy that the Group has started following already. In 
Europe, we have the case of London and Berlin, and we have others such as 
Madrid, Barcelona, Brussels and Amsterdam in the pipeline. The penetration in 
Europe will be slower than Latin America, given the current economic crisis.” 
1
 
 The presence of Pestana hotels in the South American market was visible, 
having in 2012 twelve hotels located in Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil, 
planning also to enter other countries such as Chile
2
.  
In the case of Europe, the Group was present in three countries with twenty-
three hotels across Portugal, one hotel in the United Kingdom and another in Germany. 
Plus, it was studying prospective countries, even though the European market was 
considered by the company more challenging than other markets such as the South 
American, due to the financial crisis and fierce competition from the largest 
international hotel chains. Among few countries, the company had publically showed its 
interest of entering the Spanish market, stating that “the entry in Spain will happen
” 3
. 
However, Pestana’s top management had to assess and consider multiple aspects of 
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such market and decide upon the entry mode, about which the company was open-
minded.   
2. Company Overview    
With more than €404 million of revenues in 2011, Pestana was considered the 
Portuguese largest group in the tourism and hotel industry. Its portfolio included almost 
90 four and five-star hotels across Europe, Africa, North and South America under two 
brands – Pestana Hotels & Resorts and Pousadas de Portugal – and operating in the 
leisure, business and MICE (Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, and Exhibitions) 
segments. 
Besides the hotel business, its core activity, the company also operated in other 
sectors of the tourism industry, mainly in the Portuguese market. The company claimed 
that this strategy not only reduced the level of dependence on other touristic agents, but 
also increased the attractiveness of its core business.  These sectors were gaming, golf, 
leisure real estate and air transportation through charter flights.  
2.1 The Origin  
The origin of the company dates back to the middle of the 1960’s when two 
brothers, Manuel
4
 and José Domingos Pestana, bought the Atlantic Hotel in Funchal, in 
Madeira Islands. This small hotel was later demolished in order to build what would 
soon be the Madeira Sheraton, owned by the two brothers and managed by the Sheraton 
hotel chain.  
Madeira Sheraton officially opened in 1972, founding M & J Pestana – 
Sociedade de Turismo da Madeira and setting the beginning of Pestana Group’s 
activities. Soon, José Pestana would sell his shares to his brother.  
The first years were particularly challenging for Manuel Pestana. After the 1974 
revolution
5
, Portugal entered in a period of a socioeconomic crisis, characterized by 
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rising inflation and interest rates, strikes and social instability, besides the drop in 
demand in the hotel business.   
Like other hotels in Madeira Island, the family owned business was almost 
bankrupt, facing several organizational problems and financing difficulties. However, 
Manuel was not willing to lose his hotel so, in 1976, he trusted his son, Dionísio 
Pestana, to save the business. Dionísio accepted the challenge, arriving to Madeira and 
encountering a complex situation: the workers had expelled the hotel’s director and 
wanted the Sheraton hotel chain out of the Island.  
Recently majored in Business Economics, Dionísio was a young man who did 
not speak Portuguese, once he was born and raised in Johannesburg. This did not 
prevent him from taking action right away and face the Portuguese reality and the 
company´s situation. He met with the Sheraton chain, aiming to revise the contract 
between both companies. Additionally, he was able to improve the financial condition 
of the company after meeting with Portuguese Overseas National Bank, which forgave 




2.2 Pestana’s Evolution in Portugal 
Still in Madeira, Pestana expanded its business through the construction of 
Madeira Beach Club in 1983, entering into the holiday ownership (or timesharing) 
activity. In addition, during the period of the oil crisis in 1986, Pestana acquired ITI- 
Investimentos Turísticos da Ilha da Madeira, holder of Casino Madeira complex and the 
five-star Casino Park Hotel, below its market value.   
The Group expanded to mainland Portugal only after consolidating its position 
in Madeira. In 1992, Pestana acquired five units in Algarve jointly with another 
company, Salvor, followed in 1994 by the opening of Pestana Atlantic Gardens Ocean 
& Conference Aparthotel in Cascais and more investments in the holiday ownership 
business.  
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In 1996, it also diversified to other business, acquiring golf courses in Algarve 
and Sintra. Besides this, Pestana also expanded to the airline business with euroAtlantic 
airways which was specialized in aircraft leasing and aircraft charter solutions. 
In 2001, Pestana Palace, a late nineteenth century former palace, was opened in 
Lisbon. In 2003, alongside with Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Fundação Oriente and other 
two companies, Pestana won the international bid for the management of Pousadas de 
Portugal for twenty years – a state-owned hotel chain composed of luxury, historic and 
rustic units in Portugal. These hotels represented a small part in Pestana’s business, 
approximately of 5 percent
7
.   
The company continued to invest in Portugal and in 2012 had twenty-three units, 
apart from the Pousadas. In total, the Portuguese market represented approximately 65 
percent of its revenues. 
2.3 Internationalization  
Pestana’s expansion outside Portugal started in 1998 in Mozambique, the year in 
which the company initiated the management of three four-star hotels: Pestana Rovuma 
Hotel & Conference Centre in Maputo, a building once owned by Manuel and later 
nationalized; the Pestana Inhaca Lodge in Inhaca Island; and the Pestana Bazaruto 
Lodge in Bazaruto Archipelago. 
Brazil was the next choice, having been acquired in 1999 the Rio Atlântica Hotel 
in Copacabana, Rio de Janeiro, and a year later two hotels in Angra dos Reis and 
Salvador. Over the years, the Group continued investing in this country where in 2012 it 
had nine Pestana hotels, besides the luxury hotel under Pousadas de Portugal brand, the 
only one outside Portugal so far. 
In 2002, Pestana Group celebrated “Thirty years, thirty hotels”
8
. It was also the 
year when Dionísio invested in his home country by purchasing Pestana Kruger Lodge 
Safari Resort. The following year, it expanded to Cape Verde through the acquisition of 
four-star Trópico Hotel. In the same year, it also entered São Tomé and Príncipe after 
signing a management contract regarding Pestana Equador.  
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Until this date, Pestana Group had only internationalized mainly to Portuguese-
speaking countries, apart from South Africa. But in 2006, it acquired hotels in Buenos 
Aires and in 2008 in Caracas. 
  The first expansion to a European country, besides Portugal, happened in March 
2010 when Pestana opened the Pestana Chelsea Bridge in London. In May of the 
following year it opened the Pestana Berlin Tiergarten. 
In 2012, it inaugurated Pestana Bogotá 100 in Colombia, Pestana South Beach 
Art Deco Hotel in Miami and Pestana Casablanca in Morocco. For the latter, the 
company signed a management contract with the Spanish Inveravante Group. 
Besides its complementary businesses, Pestana Group operated at this point in 
time forty-seven hotels under Pestana brand located in Portugal, Brazil, England, 
Germany, Argentina, Venezuela, Mozambique, South Africa, Cape Verde, São Tomé 
and Príncipe, Colombia, the United States and Morocco, and thirty-eight hotels under 
Pousadas de Portugal brand.  
2.4 Future Strategic Plans  
Pestana still wanted to consolidate itself internationally, being among the 
Europe’s top 25 hotel chain. Along this line of thought, the company believed that there 
were still things to do as José Roquette explained: 
“There is a lack of greater exposure in European capitals and in South 
America, iconic cities that can provide greater visibility to the Pestana Group” 
9
 
 Dionísio intended to continue its investments in South America with the aim of 
being present in all capital cities of that continent
10
 and consolidate Pestana’s brand. For 
that, the company had three projects under development: the Pestana Montevideo in 
Uruguay, the Pestana Buenos Aires Golf Hotel & Residences in Argentina and other 
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project in Brazil. Likewise, it was negotiating the acquisition of another unit in Brazil 
and the construction of a new hotel in Santiago, in Chile
11
. 
 The main question regarded the European continent, but the company was 
already studying several opportunities in some of these markets, appraising their 
dimension, political and economic stability, legal clarity, good access routes, security, 
and presence in other markets that emit tourists to the market in question, being these 
the main criteria for choosing a market. 
Spain was under its eye, publicly announcing such interest, being Madrid one of 
the main objectives.  In fact, Pestana had been analyzing the Spanish market for many 
years, considering several options for entering the entrance into such market and 
persistently studying ownership and management proposals in order to approach this 
market, but still with no final decision or conclusion.  
First, it was important for the company to understand the country’s situation and 
make an assessment of the industry, and then decide what strategy to follow. The 
strategic options regarding the Spanish market were several, but the economic condition 
of this country, and Portugal as well, the lack of credit and the competition were some 
of the setbacks, being these the biggest challenges faced by the company regarding its 
expansion and internationalization.  
 Despite this, Dionísio confirmed Pestana’s active position in the search of the 
best opportunity and entry strategy:  
“We are looking for the opportunities in Madrid; prices have fallen and 
it may be close to happen. We have spoken to the bank, because they are the 
ones with the hotels under difficult situations, but there are still adjustments to 
be made regarding the price.” 
12
 
Furthermore, Dionísio described the Group’s path as prudent and careful, 
without taking unnecessary risks and setting a limit for its debt of 30 percent of the 
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, and intended to keep the same strategy for the future.  In addition, the company 
was considering widening its hotel offer by betting on three-star hotels, besides four and 
five-star, in order to cover a higher range of projects and destinations.  
3. The Competitive Environment 
Despite the economic and financial challenges in many countries, the industry 
presented overall positive results. In 2011, the growth rate of international tourist 
spending was of 3.8 percent comparing to the previous year, reaching €740 billion (See 
Exhibit 1). The number of international tourist arrivals surpassed 982 million
14
, 
representing increase of 4.6 percent during the same period of time. 2012 started 
showing even greater results, and the forecast was for this number to reach one billion 
by the end of that year. In a long-term perspective, it was expected to grow about 3.3 
percent annually until 2020
15
 (See Exhibit 2). 
At this point in time, tourism market was very concentrated, given that 45 
percent of the international arrivals in 2010 were for the top ten countries, although the 
trend was for this level of concentration to decrease.   
Several destinations had been emerging over the years, especially in the Asia 
Pacific region, challenging the traditional European and North American ones. The 
long-term forecast was for emerging countries to have more tourist arrivals than the 
developed ones, although its growth rate between 2010 and 2011 was lower in the first 
case due to the setbacks in the Middle East and North Africa. But for the first time in 
history international arrivals were estimated to be higher in emerging economies in 
2012.   
On the other hand, Europe saw strong growth in arrivals from emerging 
economies in 2011, particularly Russia, China and Brazil. It was expected for this trend 
to continue throughout 2012, but it was unlikely to compensate for the decline in intra-
regional visitors. 
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Furthermore, the 2008/2009 financial crisis had affected the tourism and global 
hotel industry, especially the European economies which in 2012 were still struggling in 
innumerable ways. Although the uncertainty about the European economy and the 
governments’ austerity did not cause major falls in tourism demand, the trend was of 
slowing growth
16
. Still, there were differences in performance within the European 
market. In particular, it was the case of Southern Europe nations that relied on massive 
deficits. And Spain was no exception, neither was Portugal. 
 José Theotónio, Pestana’s CFO, stated: 
“[The crisis] it has particularly affected our hotels in Portugal since the 




In these countries, credit constraints were the main problem for a great number 
of companies not only in the hotel industry but in other industries as well, and it was 
expected to continue as so
18
.  In fact, access to financing was the most problematic 
factor for doing business in Spain (and in Portugal). 
3.1 The Spanish Market  
Spain ranked as the thirtieth most competitive country in the world in 2012
19
, 
classifying it as an innovation-driven economy in terms of stage of development, 
instead of a factor or efficiency-driven economy.  
The Spanish reality was characterized not only by the credit constraints, as 
referred, but also by the alarming unemployment rates and raising taxes. For the first 
time in history, unemployment rates reached the 25 percent in 2012, and the 54 percent 
for the youth unemployment
20
.  
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Furthermore, in September 2012, the VAT increased three percentage points to 
21 percent for the general category and two percentage points to 10 percent in the case 
of the reduced category, maintaining unchanged the 4 percent of the super-reduced one.  
3.1.1 Tourism in Spain 
In 2011, Spain ranked as eighth most competitive country in travel and tourism, 
falling two positions since 2009
21
, analysis that was based on several factors such as 
regulations, environmental sustainability, security, health and hygiene, transport 
infrastructure, tourism infrastructure, price competitiveness, among others. Its 
attractiveness relied also on diverse aspects of the country like its location, climate, 
coasts and islands, culture and environmental variety. In addition, it was the third most 
popular congress and convention destination in the world in 2011, after the United 
States and Germany
22
, the second country in the world in 2012 with more monuments 
classified as World Heritage Site
23




Representing more than 10 percent of the GDP
25
, tourism in Spain was 
noticeably a large market, ranked between the world’s top ten countries in terms of 
international tourist spending and international tourist arrivals (See Exhibit 3 and 4).  
Moreover, the growth of international tourist arrivals in Southern and Mediterranean 
Europe was mostly driven by the most common destinations, and Spain was one of 
them with almost 8 percent growth between 2010 and 2011. This growth was in part 
due to the wave of protests and conflicts known as the Arab Spring which started at the 
end of 2010 in the Middle East and North of Africa, especially in Egypt, Libya and 
Tunisia, which were causing the migration of tourist flows to other destinations. As for 
the international tourist spending, it accounted for approximately €38 billion, 
representing a significant increase comparing to the previous year. 
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The international tourists had as country of origin predominantly other European 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and France (See Exhibit 5). 
Regarding the Autonomous Regions of destination, Catalonia, the Canary Islands, the 
Balearic Islands and Andalusia were among the most popular ones, receiving a great 
part of the international tourists (See Exhibit 6). Regarding the Spanish residents, the 
total number of trips accounted for 160.8 millions in 2011 (rising approximately 1.7 
percent comparing to the previous year), out of which 147.4 corresponded to domestic 
tourism (See Exhibit 7). It was also known that a big percentage of this number stayed 
at owned, family or friends’ dwelling.   
 Moreover, the national Government approved a plan for the period 2012-2016 
with the aim of increasing the competiveness and profitability of the tourism industry, 
establishing a budget between the €1,600 and €1,800 million for the period. The actions 
would include the international promotion and better positioning of Spanish 
destinations, the development of a loyalty program for tourists in order to create 
incentives for return
26
, a more efficient process for obtaining visas and the review and 
possible amendment of certain laws. 
3.1.2 Hotel Industry in Spain  
 In 2011, the total spending in the hotel industry increased 8.4 percent to €11,600 
million, registering a higher growth in holiday units (10.1 percent) than urban units (5.3 
percent)
27
. The total number of travelers accommodated in hotels accounted for 85.4 
million, representing an increase of 4 percent comparing to 2010
28
, and were mostly 
accommodated in four-star hotels. Furthermore, 54 percent out of the total number of 
travelers were Spanish residents and 46 percent non-residents, mostly from other 
European countries (See Exhibit 8 and 9). However, 61 percent out of the 286.8 million 
of the total hotel overnights corresponded to non-residents. Besides this, between 2010 
and 2011, the growth in hotel overnights was of 12.55 percent for non-residents and -
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1.83 percent for residents, tendency that was expected to continue for the near future
29
, 
given the financial crisis and unemployment lived in Spain.   
The regions that accommodated a higher percentage of these travelers were 
Catalonia, Andalusia, Community of Madrid, Balearic Islands and Canary Islands (See 
Exhibit 10). 
 In the year 2011, there were on average fifteen thousand hotel establishments 
operating nationwide and 1,427,700 rooms, and it was estimated that 30 percent of these 
establishments were managed by a hotel chain. On average, the occupation rate in terms 
of available beds grew by 5 percent in 2011 (See Exhibit 11). The average daily rate 
(ADR) accounted for €70, 1.4 percent higher than 2009. Disaggregating it in categories, 
the ADR was of €148 for five-star hotels, of €78 for four-star hotels and €58 for three-
star hotels. As for the revenue per available room (RevPAR), it grew 6.4 percent, 
reaching the €40 – per categories, €86, €52 and €37, respectively
30
. 
On the other hand, investments in the hotel industry were direct and negatively 
affected by the credit limitations, but some were more affected than others. Independent 
hotels would be more vulnerable to volatile market conditions than the largest hotel 
chains, as credit became harder to obtain, becoming potential acquisition targets. Also 
hotel chains were affected in terms of bank loans. 
However, it was somehow different for international hotel chains. The presence 
of large and foreign hotel chains in Spain were becoming more powerful and were 
expected to gain more market share in the future since credit was being cut to Spanish 
hotel firms. In fact, the foreign hotel supply more than doubled during 2011, and the 
objective for many of them was to expand even more in Spain
31
. At this point in time, 
the main foreign hotel chains in the Spanish market were Marriott International (AC by 
Marriot and Ritz-Carlton, among others), Accor (Novotel, Sofitel, Mercure, Ibis), 
Wyndham Hotel Group, InterContinental Hotels Group, Starwood Hotels & Resorts and 
Hilton Worldwide, which were all among the top ten hotel chains in the world. Still, 
some Spanish hotel chains presented good results in their home country. It was the case 
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of NH Hoteles, Meliá, Riu, Barceló and Iberostar, the Spanish top five hotel chains in 
revenues, and among the 35 top hotel chains in the world, yet moving further way from 
the ten largest global chains
32
. 
Furthermore, the top ten hotel chains in terms of number of rooms concentrated 
in 2011 18 percent of the capacity of the hotels in Spain: Meliá with 3.8 percent, NH 
Hoteles with 3 percent, Barceló with 1.9, Riu with 1.7, Marriott with 1.4, Iberostar with 




In general, the growth of the Spanish hotel capacity remained low throughout 
2011 and it was seen mostly in urban areas and in the four and three-star category. 
Overall, a lower percentage of growth was expected for the following year
34
, though it 
was projected that urban areas like Madrid and Barcelona would have higher values. 
Some of the Spanish largest hotel chains were even reducing its real estate assets 
in order to increase liquidity and invest in other markets (Asia, South America, Middle 
East and Africa), and it was expected to continue as so for the near future
35
, although 
keeping its management in most cases. In addition, many hotel owners and investors 
were selling its assets as well. Given the financial crisis, the price of hotel 
establishments was falling. It was the case of the acquisition of seven hotel 
establishments including the InterContinental Madrid by the Lebanese investor Toufic 
Aboukhater for €450 million to Morgan Stanley’s real estate fund, which had acquired 
the assets for €634 million back in 2006. 
The difficulty in obtaining credit was increasingly making hotel companies to 
seek for expansion strategies that would require low capital outflow, like management 
contracts and franchising, which were gaining acceptance in Spain. The percentage of 
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33
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34
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35
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02B [Online]. Available at: 
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hotel property in the case of Spanish hotels was higher comparing to the largest 
international hotel chains, which had been focused essentially on signing management 
and franchising contracts for expanding in Spain. However, Spanish hotel chains were 
embracing more and more these types of strategies.  
In fact, it was expected for these types of strategies to continue in the 
short/medium term in the case of both Spanish and international hotel chains
36
, gaining 
more popularity in detriment of other strategies like owner-run and leasing. And 
although the latter was the most popular format for the types of new contracts signed in 
2011 in Spain, around 70 percent established part or even 100 percent of variable return 
to the landlords.  
There were also some important business combinations between hotel 
companies. For instance, it was the case of the acquisition of half of the Spanish leading 
business-urban hotel chain AC Hotels (85 hotels) by Marriott in 2011, which would be 
operated under AC Hotels by Marriot and Autograph by Marriot brands. Another 
example in the industry was the Spanish hotel chain Meliá International Hotels, which 
signed a sales and operations contract with the Chinese Jin Jiang International Hotel 
Company, with the aim of cooperating in the expansion of the Spanish Group 
throughout China and the expansion of Jin Jiang International in the European market.  
Actually, Pestana had already adopted a similar strategy in Portugal, signing in 
2009 commercial and distribution agreement for a minimum period of three years with 
the German group Rewe Touristik Hotels, which included tour operators, travel 
agencies and hotel brands such as LTI hotels, Club Calimera, and PrimaSol, for the 
Pestana Grand Hotel in Madeira. In 2011, signed the same agreement for the Pestana 
Viking in Algarve. Pestana would keep the management of these hotels, respecting the 
standards determined by Rewe and changing the unit names to LTI Pestana Grand Hotel 
and LTI Pestana Viking Hotel, the only two hotels with LTI brand in Portugal. Rewe 
would commercialize these hotels in Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Benelux, 
which were relevant markets for the Portuguese inbound tourism.    
But access to credit was not the only issue. As unemployment rates rose, 
consumers started to cut unnecessary costs – which include leisure, entertainment and 
tourism spending. Not only in Spain but in other countries as well, travelers were 
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becoming more price-sensitive and cost-conscious, looking more and more for 
discounts and special offers. At this point, there was already a clear reduction of the 
MICE segment and a higher price sensitivity on the corporate segment. 
4. Outlook  
It was indeed a difficult time for Spain and, overall, the expectations were not 
the greatest. Even though Pestana had decided already to enter the Spanish market, it 
was important for the company to reach a conclusion about the opportunities in the 
tourism and hotel industry, considering the relevant factors and events. Was Spain a 
good option? It was then imperative to define what would be the possible entry 





EXHIBIT 1 – International market spending (2011) 
 


















EXHIBIT 2 – UNWTO Tourism Towards 2030: International tourism by region of destination 
 
 
Source: World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)  
¹ Classication based on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
  
International Tourist Arrivals received (million) Average annual growth (%) 
Share (%) 
  
Actual data Projections Actual data Projections 
  
1980 1995 2010 2020 2030 1980-'95 95-2010 2010-'20 2020-'30 2010-'30 2010 2030 
World 277 528 940 1,360 1,809 4.4 3.9 3.3 3.8 2.9 100 100 
  to Advanced economies¹ 194 334 498 643 772 3.7 2.7 2.2 2.6 1.8 53 43 
  to Emerging economies¹ 83 193 442 717 1,037 5.8 5.7 4.4 4.9 3.8 47 57 
Europe 177.3 304.1 475.3 620 744 3.7 3.0 2.3 2.7 1.8 50.6 41.1 
  Northern Europe 20.4 35.8 57.5 72 82 3.8 3.2 1.8 2.2 1.4 6.1 4.5 
  Western Europe 68.3 112.2 153.7 192 222 3.4 2.1 1.8 2.3 1.4 16.3 12.3 
  Central/Easter Europe 26.6 58.1 95.0 137 176 5.3 3.3 3.1 3.7 2.5 10.1 9.7 
  Southern/Mediter. Europe 61.9 98.0 168.9 219 264 3.1 3.7 2.3 2.6 2.5 18.0 14.6 
Americas 62.3 109.0 149.7 199 242 3.8 2.1 2.6 2.9 2.2 15.9 13.7 
Asia Pacific 22.8 82.0 204.0 355 535 8.9 6.3 4.9 5.7 4.2 21.7 29.6 
Africa 7.2 18.9 50.3 85 134 6.7 6.7 5.0 5.4 4.6 5.3 7.4 
Middle East 7.1 13.7 60.9 101 149 4.5 10.5 4.6 5.2 4.0 6.5 8.2 
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EXHIBIT 3 – International tourist arrivals 
   
       Million        Change % 
Rank Countries Series 2010 2011* 10/09 11*/10 
1 France TF 77.1 79.5 0.5 3.0 
2 United States TF 59.8 62.3 8.8 4.2 
3 China  TF 55.7 57.6 9.4 3.4 
4 Spain TF 52.7 56.7 1.0 7.6 
5 Italy TF 43.6 46.1 0.9 5.7 
6 Turkey TF 27.0 29.3 5.9 8.7 
7 United Kingdom TF 28.3 29.2 0.4 3.2 
8 Germany TCE 26.9 28.4 10.9 5.5 
9 Malaysia TF 24.6 24.7 3.9 0.6 
10 Mexico TF 23.3 23.4 4.2 0.5 
 
Source: United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) 
* provisional figure or data;  
TF: International tourist arrivals at frontiers (excluding same-day visitors);  
TCE: International tourist arrivals at collective tourism establishments. 
 
 
EXHIBIT 4 – International tourist spending 
  
US$ Local Currency 
  
Billion Change % Change % 
Rank Countries 2010 2011* 10/09 11*/10 10/09 11*/10 
1 United States 103.5 116.3 9.9 12.3 9.9 12.3 
2 Spain 52.5 59.9 -1.2 14.0 3.9 8.6 
3 France  46.6 53.8 -6.0 15.6 -1.1 10.1 
4 China 45.8 48.5 15.5 5.8 15.5 5.8 ($) 
5 Italy 38.8 43.0 -3.6 10.9 1.4 5.6 
6 Germany 34.7 38.8 0.1 12.0 5.3 6.7 
7 United Kingdom 32.4 35.9 7.5 10.9 8.4 6.9 
8 Australia 29.8 31.4 17.4 5.5 -0.2 -6.2 
9 Macao (China) 27.8 .. 53.2 .. 53.5 .. 
10 Hong Kong (China) 22.2 27.7 35.3 24.7 35.6 25.0 
 
Source: United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) 
* provisional figure or data;  





























Total % Change 
Total 56,694,298 7.6 
Germany 9,030,697 2.5 
Austria 586,539 4.5 
Belgium 1,779,073 9.6 
Denmark 921,048 -1.8 
Finland 564,834 11.4 
France 8,498,430 4.6 
Ireland 1,280,465 8.8 
Italy 3,766,597 7.9 
Norway 1,117,375 9.9 
Netherlands 2,776,058 21.9 
Portugal 1,787,705 -5.7 
United Kingdom 13,611,003 9.4 
Russia 858,545 41.8 
Sweden 1,282,911 15.3 
Switzerland 1,373,643 18.7 
Rest Of Europe 2,666,952 4.6 
United States Of America 1,148,186 1.2 
Argentina 299,396 8.3 
Brazil 360,006 49.2 
Canada 228,285 20.5 
Chile 37,396 111.2 
Mexico 233,293 25.6 
Venezuela 105,853 106.6 
Others America 459,887 -11.9 
Japan 334,314 0.4 
Rest Of The World 1,585,809 10.4 
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EXHIBIT 6 – Tourist entries broken down by main destination (Autonomous Regions) in 
2011 
 
Total % Change 
Total 56,694,298 7.6 
Andalusia 7,884,875 6.0 
Aragon 311,833 -5.9 
Asturias (Pr. de) 199,135 10.5 
Balearic Islands 10,099,465 9.8 
Canary Islands 10,187,690 18.3 
Cantabria 305,163 9.7 
Castile - La Mancha 153,088 0.6 
Castile and León 1,081,162 9.5 
Catalonia 13,767,684 4.7 
Valencia (C.) 5,383,340 7.2 
Extremadura 180,585 -3.8 
Galicia 685,022 -0.5 
Madrid (C.) 4,606,471 -0.6 
Murcia (R.) 645,439 -4.6 
Navarre (C. Foral) 187,257 6.8 
Basque Country 970,181 7.4 
La Rioja  45,907 -13.4 
 













EXHIBIT 7 – Number of travels by domestic and outbound destinations 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total 168,843,820 167,012,614 157,856,547 160,754,374 
Domestic (Spain) Tourism 157,614,545 154,995,306 145,477,420 147,407,636 
Andalusia 28,456,420 28,679,657 25,776,964 26,819,589 
Aragon 8,274,067 7,016,188 5,881,664 5,952,034 
Asturias (Pr. de) 4,165,626 4,400,475 4,452,204 5,129,824 
Balearic Islands 2,970,993 2,724,367 2,750,968 2,940,028 
Canary Islands 4,308,093 5,106,519 5,019,101 4,512,818 
Cantabria 3,067,865 3,231,128 3,755,147 3,263,706 
Castile - La Mancha 13,312,812 11,886,639 11,355,997 11,585,423 
Castile and León 16,374,469 16,389,055 17,205,004 15,756,591 
Catalonia 22,843,296 22,366,755 20,531,052 22,251,838 
Valencia (C.) 17,323,886 17,762,051 15,548,853 15,569,698 
Extremadura 4,989,959 4,951,486 4,678,074 4,386,584 
Galicia 8,652,457 8,474,302 8,018,305 7,553,873 
Madrid (C.) 11,075,067 10,437,356 9,547,929 10,108,078 
Murcia (R.) 3,677,497 3,577,084 3,585,900 3,594,376 
Navarre (C. Foral) 2,903,251 2,897,481 2,322,903 2,403,252 
Basque Country 3,512,200 3,449,127 3,332,977 3,782,019 
La Rioja  1,500,273 1,475,414 1,530,899 1,665,709 
Ceuta And Melilla 206,314 170,221 183,479 NA 
Outbound Tourism 11,229,275 12,017,308 12,379,127 13,346,738 
Germany 552,568 611,440 621,366 765,592 
France 2,393,511 2,375,012 2,270,325 2,423,234 
Portugal 1,396,541 1,371,442 1,492,909 1,633,719 
United Kingdom 720,471 857,651 898,547 1,145,977 
European Union 7,246,309 7,616,341 8,014,910 8,951,730 
Rest Of Europe 1,390,354 1,423,169 1,350,209 1,506,991 
Europe 8,636,663 9,039,510 9,365,120 10,458,721 
North America 343,929 377,346 357,270 399,856 
South America 987,077 1,118,206 975,317 1,061,810 
America 1,331,006 1,495,552 1,332,587 1,461,666 
Africa 897,995 1,156,736 1,252,484 1,010,910 
Asia 353,934 321 414,659 406,962 








EXHIBIT 8 – Number of travelers and overnight stays by categories of establishment  
Category Number of travelers   Number of overnight stays   
 
Total Residents Residents Total Residents Residents 
  
in Spain abroad 
 
in Spain abroad 




TOTAL (2011) 85,366,976 45,824,882 39,542,094 286,761,260 111,524,330 175,236,930 
HOTELS: Golden stars 
      
Five 4,870,061 1,976,914 2,893,147 15,671,047 4,506,588 11,164,459 
Four 37,392,836 19,341,041 18,051,795 129,583,303 46,483,742 83,099,561 
Three 25,977,159 13,384,500 12,592,659 98,100,499 35,563,721 62,536,778 
Two 6,706,895 4,284,862 2,422,033 17,933,742 9,872,446 8,061,296 
One 2,481,733 1,604,681 877,052 6,094,809 3,351,550 2,743,259 
INNS: Silver stars             
Two and three 4,361,568 2,950,932 1,410,636 10,434,203 6,192,903 4,241,300 
One 3,576,728 2,281,953 1,294,775 8,943,661 5,553,382 3,390,279 
Annual rate 4.25% -1.17% 10.19% 6.45% -1.83% 12.55% 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) 
 
Year 
Total number of people 



















EXHIBIT 9 – Number of travelers and overnight stays by country of residence (2011) 
Results by countries 
Countries Number of travelers Overnight stays 
  Total % Total % 
TOTAL 85,366,976 100.00 286,761,260 100,00 
Residents in Spain 45,824,882 53.68 111,524,330 38.89 
Residents abroad 39,542,094 46.32 175,236,930 61.11 
Total  Residents abroad 39,542,094 100.00 175,236,930 100.00 
Total  Residents in U.E. (without Spain) 29,221,608 73.90 144,982,274 82.73 
Germany 7,122,227 18.01 47,000,767 26.82 
Austria 386,465 0.98 1,771,063 1.01 
Belgium 1,044,485 2.64 5,439,535 3.10 
Denmark 463,109 1.17 2,523,244 1.44 
Finland 275,427 0.70 1,314,827 0.75 
France 4,227,160 10.69 12,141,416 6.93 
Greece 146,534 0.37 434,151 0.25 
Ireland 546,755 1.38 2,444,829 1.40 
Italy 2,833,011 7.16 9,378,102 5.35 
Luxembourg 76,209 0.19 446,311 0.25 
Netherlands 1,485,998 3.76 7,029,259 4.01 
Poland 512,299 1.30 2,454,486 1.40 
Portugal 1,214,535 3.07 3,136,338 1.79 
United Kingdom 7,293,020 18.44 42,194,981 24.08 
Czech Republic 197,669 0.50 1,015,422 0.58 
Sweden 742,767 1.88 3,905,603 2.23 
Rest of UE* 653,943 1.65 2,351,939 1.34 
Norway 445,760 1.13 2,338,035 1.33 
Russia 979,383 2.48 5,721,741 3.27 
Switzerland 690,615 1.75 3,111,393 1.78 
Rest of Europe 844,455 2.14 2,711,979 1.55 
Japan 607,371 1.54 1,020,401 0.58 
United States of America 1,994,258 5.04 4,384,027 2.50 
Rest of America 2,350,885 5.95 5,375,830 3.07 
African's countries 421,396 1.07 930,590 0.53 
Rest of the world 1,986,354 5.02 4,660,653 2.66 
     * Rest of UE: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and 
Romania 







EXHIBIT 10 – Travelers and average stay by destination (Autonomous Regions) 
 
Number of travelers   
 
Average stay 
   




abroad    
TOTAL 85,366,976 45,824,882 39,542,094 3.36 
   
Andalusia 14,894,506 8,992,305 5,902,201 2.84 
   
Aragon 2,154,307 1,784,712 369,595 1.97 
   
Asturias (Pr. de) 1,451,994 1,267,273 184,721 2.09 
   
Balearic Islands 8,378,477 1,404,186 6,974,291 6.42 
   
Canary Islands 7,936,706 2,245,208 5,691,498 7.37 
   
Cantabria 1,055,791 866,210 189,581 2.23 
   
Castile - La Mancha 4,216,226 3,372,117 844,109 1.68 
   
Castile and León 1,911,228 1,585,070 326,158 1.75 
   
Catalonia 16,506,258 6,608,596 9,897,662 2.92 
   
Valencia (C.) 6,943,498 4,665,674 2,277,824 3.52 
   
Extremadura 1,273,517 1,076,357 197,160 1.75 
   
Galicia 3,354,068 2,631,462 722,606 2.13 
   
Madrid (C.) 10,371,527 5,702,059 4,669,468 1.93 
   
Murcia (R.) 1,022,373 838,733 183,640 2.63 
   
Navarre (C. Foral) 814,826 630,773 184,053 1.89 
   
Basque Country 2,416,091 1,608,195 807,896 1.92 
   
La Rioja  534,021 446,306 87,715 1.75 
   
Ceuta  80,700 59,434 21,266 2.01 
   
Melilla 50,856 40,205 10,651 2.66 
   
 




EXHIBIT 11 – Establishments, capacity, and occupancy by categories of establishment 





available beds  
TOTAL (2011) 14,997 1,427,700 53.47% 
HOTELS: Golden stars 
   Five 251 81,375 52.00% 
Four 1,929 571,746 60.34% 
Three 2,515 426,629 60.66% 
Two 1,890 117,721 41.00% 
One 1,189 51,049 32.20% 
INNS: Silver stars 
   Two and three 3,083 94,550 29.91% 
One 4,140 84,629 28.68% 
 








1999 15,042 1,011,015 
2000 14,870 1,033,011 
2001 14,880 1,055,864 
2002 13,523 1,080,290 
2003 13,680 1,122,052 
2004 13,845 1,175,514 
2005 13,991 1,212,598 
2006 14,056 1,263,779 
2007 14,228 1,297,649 
2008 14,696 1,340,439 
2009 14,824 1,363,934 
2010 14,838 1,398,900 
2011 14,997 1,427,700 
 




TEACHING NOTES  
1. Introduction 
This section aims to give instructors with a guide plan, identifying the key 
aspects about Pestana case study. In addition, some suggestions and recommendations 
for the class discussion are also provided.  
2. Synopsis 
Pestana, a Portuguese hotel chain, was founded in 1972. It started its 
internationalization process back in 1998 entering into Mozambique; in 2012, the Group 
was present in 13 countries. The company’s strategic plan for internationalization was 
based in two lines: the emerging destinations of South America and the traditional 
European markets.  
Pestana was already present in several cities in South American countries and it 
had few ongoing projects for future expansion in Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. 
The main question regarded the European capitals, showing particular interest in Spain. 
But yet, no decision was made. The financial crisis and the fact that the Spanish hotel 
industry was highly competitive were the main constraints. Nevertheless, Pestana 
continued to study this market in order to seek for opportunities. Is the Spanish industry 
attractive enough? Is it a good option to enter the market? If so, what would be the best 
entry strategy? 
3. Suggested assignment questions 
Students should read the case and prepare the following recommended questions: 
1. How would you describe the company’s evolution and strategy? 
2. How would you describe the hotel industry in Spain? What are the opportunities 
and threats in such market? 




4. In what ways can Pestana benefit from the entrance in the Spanish market? 
5. What are the possible modes of entry in Spain? What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of those strategies? 
6. How could Pestana benefit from a strategic alliance in the Spanish market? Should 
Pestana try to pursue this strategy? 
7. If eventually Pestana enters the Spanish market, what should its strategy be? (Note: 
you may consider the industry key success factors to answer this question) 
4. Teaching objectives 
The case study was prepared with the following teaching objectives: 
 For students to analyze the external environment, both at macro and 
microeconomic level, making use of strategic frameworks and tools, like PEST 
analysis, Porter’s five forces and SWOT analysis, in order to identify the key 
aspects. 
 For students to interpret and analyze the data and figures about the environment 
and the company.  
 For students to understand the different modes of entry in a market or foreign 
country, both generic and specific for the hotel industry. 
 For students to understand the strategic implications involved when entering into 
a foreign country, challenging them to identify and evaluate the possible 
strategies. 
5. Use of the case 
This case study was prepared in order to illustrate a real and particular 
internationalization situation, and dilemma, about a Portuguese company. It was 
developed as a class discussion case and might be used in strategy courses (Strategy, 
Strategic Management), as well as in courses of industry analysis (International Industry 




6. Relevant theory 
6.1 Strategic frameworks and tools 
The nature and level of competition in an industry depends on five forces – and 
the weaker these forces are, higher the expected profitability of the industry (Porter, 
1979). In other words, the structure of an industry will drive the competition and 
profitability (Porter, 2008). The forces are threat of new entry, bargaining power of 
customers, bargaining power of suppliers, threat of substitute products or services and 
rivalry among existing competitors. 
Furthermore, Grundy (2006) has stated that Porter’s model could be further 
developed analyzing growth drivers and PEST factors (Political, legal and regulatory 
environment; Economic environment; Social and cultural environment; and 
Technologic environment), among other elements. Other popular tool is SWOT 
(Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis. It may be also important 
to determine the stage in the life cycle, a concept that was studied by Vernon (1966), 
among others. The generic stages are the introduction, growth, maturity and decline. 
Students may find these frameworks and tools in several strategy manuals, for 
example: 
 Lynch, Richard, 2009, Strategic Management, fifth edition, Prentice Hall; 
 Johnson, Gerry, Kevan Scholes and Richard Whittington, 2008, Exploring 
Corporate Strategy, eighth edition, Prentice Hall. 
6.2 The hotel industry 
Competitors in the hotel industry are determined mainly by price and segment 
and especially by proximity in terms of location (Mathews, 2000).   
Furthermore, Tarí, Claver-Cortés, Pereira-Moliner and Azorín (2009) identified 
the key success factors in the Spanish hotel industry. They are, by order, quality 
management commitment (leadership, quality planning, people management, customer 
focus, process management, supplier management, continuous improvement and 
product design), training, facilities (hotel category, size, number of rooms, room 
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equipment and number of services) and chain affiliation, information and 
communication technologies and information systems and environmental management. 
6.3 Internationalization 
International modes of entry can be classified into two generic groups: non-
equity modes, including exports and contractual agreements, and equity modes (or 
foreign direct investment), either through joint ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries 
(Pan and Tse, 2000). Given the characteristics of the hotel business, exports can be 
excluded as an option for mode of entry. As so, the possible modes of entry in the hotel 
industry are again divided into two categories: equity or investment-based (joint 
ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries) and non-equity or contract-based, including 
management contracts and franchising agreements (Quer, Claver and Andreu, 2007). 
Students can find the generic entry modes in several strategy manuals, but do not 
necessarily have to search for the ones that are specific to the hotel industry once there 
are clues in the case study. 
Furthermore, there are many theories related to internationalization process. One 
of them is the Uppsala School model. It states that a company enters foreign markets 
gradually as it increases its experiential market knowledge from current business 
activities which can be acquired through personal experience: first, it enters into similar 
markets with psychic or mental proximity (language, culture, political systems, among 
others) and then to markets with greater distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990); at the 
same time, companies gradually develop different entry modes (Machková, Král and 








7. Analysis and discussion 
1. How would you describe the company’s evolution and strategy? 
An interesting way of answering this question is to explain the evolution of 
Pestana’s business model, and in particular, its profit formula and revenue model 
(Johnson, Christensen and Kagermann, 2008). Given this, there are three steps or 
phases. 
Ownership, but not management: Pestana was founded in 1972, and the revenue 
model was based on the ownership of the Madeira Sheraton. In other words, the 
company owned the hotel but it was managed by the Sheraton Group. In this situation, 
Pestana paid a fee to Sheraton and assume all the risks and financial difficulties of the 
hotel. Since Pestana had no experience in hotel management, perhaps it was a good 
choice to hire a management company. And only in 1990, Sheraton left the management 
of the unit and Pestana assumed that position.  
Ownership and management: The second stage was based on acquisitions and 
constructions of establishments, which the company would operate under its brand. It is 
also pertinent here the complementary businesses that Pestana acquired such as golfing, 
which reduced the level of dependence of third-party entities (vertical integration). In 
these cases, Pestana assumed all the risks of its businesses, but here, it did not have to 
pay any fees to a management company.  
Management contracts and alliances: More recently, Pestana’s business model 
saw a change when the company started signing management contracts and partner with 
other companies, which required much less investment. It happened, for example, in 
Morocco with Pestana Casablanca which is owned by the Spanish Inveravante Group, 
but managed by Pestana. As for the strategic alliances, it is important to highlight the 
partnership with German group Rewe Touristik and its consequent co-branding, among 
other conditions of the agreement.  
This is a similar evolution to some Spanish hotel chains which, according to the 
case, still have a high percentage of property but are embracing these new strategies, or 
business models, in order to expand.  
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Another way to answer this question is to understand the strategy of the 
company using the Uppsala model which is explained above.  
First, Pestana started its operations in Madeira in 1972 when Dionísio’s father 
opened Madeira Sheraton. In 1976, he trusted his son, Dionísio, the business. It was not 
until 1992, after expanding and gaining experience in Madeira, that the company 
invested in mainland Portugal.  
The internationalization process first started with countries like Mozambique, 
Brazil Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, which are culturally close due to the 
fact that are all Portuguese-speaking regions.  During this period, Pestana also enter into 
the South African market and although it is not a Portuguese-speaking country, it is 
Dionísio’s home country and perhaps this fact reflects the proximity.   
Then, according to Uppsala theory, the company would expand to markets with 
greater distance, as it gained experiential market knowledge: Argentina, Venezuela, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Colombia, the United States of America and Morocco. 
Pestana also developed different entry modes, for instance, the management contract to 
enter in Morocco. 
2. How would you describe the hotel industry in Spain? What are the 
opportunities and threats in such market? 
There are several frameworks that can be used to answer this question. For 
example, PEST analysis aims to identify the macro environment factors that have an 
impact on tourism and hotel industry. In addition, the Industry’s Lifecycle can also be 
used in order to identify the stage in which the industry is in. Then, the Porter’s Five 
Forces is used to assess the attractiveness of the competitive environment. Finally, 
students may identify the opportunities and threats taking into account some of the 
conclusions from the latter frameworks.  
PEST Analysis:  
 Political, Legal and Regulatory Environment 
Within the political factors, there is the plan of the national Government for 
2012-2016, which is expected to have a positive impact on the tourism industry. The 
measures include: the international promotion and better positioning of Spain which 
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may attract more tourists; the loyalty programs and cards for tourists, aiming for them to 
repeat the trips; a more efficient procedure for issuing visas; and the review and possible 
amendment of the legislation, among others.  
In addition, the fact that Spain belongs to the European Union also contributes 
positively because EU citizens can travel freely to the member countries, not requiring 
any visa, which is particular important once the major part of the international tourists 
come from the EU. 
Spain is a political stable country and that has a positive impact. As mentioned 
in the case, there was a shift in international tourist arrivals from the Middle East and 
the North of Africa to safer countries, like Spain.  
 Economic Factors 
The financial downturn, affecting especially the Eurozone, has a direct and 
negative impact due to the credit restrictions and constraints. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the Government response to the crisis will somehow shape the future 
results and performance not only of the tourism and hotel industries but also of other 
industries. On the other hand, as the prices of some establishments have fallen due to 
the crisis, it may represent an opportunity for some companies that are looking to 
acquire.    
Furthermore, VAT increased in September 2012, affecting both companies and 
individual consumers. Plus, unemployment in Spain has reached alarming levels in 
2012, surpassing the 25 percent. In general, companies are cutting its budgets and 
therefore this has negative consequences on the hotel industry because business 
travelers and MICE are becoming more cost-conscious and price-sensitive. These 
factors also affect the disposable income of the individual consumers, which are 
expected to cut its spending in activities related to leisure and entertainment and become 
more price-sensitive. 
 Socio and Cultural Environment 
The economic environment has affected, in some extent, the social and cultural 
environment and consequently having a negative impact on the demand in the hotel 
industry. Spanish travelers are expected to become more reluctant when it comes to 
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traveling. These factors had an impact on the number of Spanish residents 
accommodated in hotels and in the overnight stays, which have decreased from 2010 to 
2011 by 1.17 percent and 1.83 percent (Exhibit 8), respectively. The domestic tourism 
has actually increased during that period by 1.32 percent (calculated with data from 
Exhibit 7), but there are less Spanish domestic travelers willing to stay at hotels, 
meaning that they are choosing other options such as owned, family or friends’ 
dwelling, for instance, which are less expensive; and those who do choose hotels, are 
reducing the overnight stays.  
 Technological Environment 
Spain ranks among the top ten most competitive countries in the world in the 
travel and tourism industry. As mentioned, the ranking is elaborated according to 
several factors, few of them corresponding to technological ones. It is the case of 
transportation and access routes, tourism infrastructure and environmental 
sustainability, contributing positively to the hotel industry.  
Industry Lifecycle:  
 In order to determine in the stage the Spanish hotel industry – introduction, 
growth, maturity and decline – it is important to assess several indicators. For example, 
it may be important to analyze the demand, the investments, the number of competitors, 
the market growth, size and profitability throughout several years, among other possible 
elements, so as the trends and forecasts. In this particular case and with the information 
that is available, the parameters can be the growth in international tourist arrivals, the 
domestic tourism, the total number of people accommodated in hotels, the number of 
hotels establishments and the number of available rooms, along with other factors. 
  First of all, the global trend is for emerging destinations to receive more 
international tourists than traditional ones.  The expected average annual growth of 
international tourist arrivals in advanced economies is 1.8 percent between 2010 and 
2030, which is lower than in emerging economies (Exhibit 2).  
Although Spain is not discriminated in the forecasts presented in Exhibit 2, 
values are presented for Southern and Mediterranean European region. The international 
tourist arrivals grew on average by 3.1 percent per year between 1980 and 1995 and 3.7 
percent between 1995 and 2010. In a long term perspective, it was forecasted to increase 
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annually by 2.5 percent until 2030. It was also estimated that the share in international 
tourist arrivals will decrease from 18 percent in 2010 to 14 percent in 2030 for the 
Southern and Mediterranean Europe, considering the global tourism industry. It is also 
relevant to mention that despite that the international tourist arrivals grew by 8 percent 
and non-resident tourists accommodated in hotels by 10 percent between 2010 and 
2011, this is likely to have happened in part because of the conflicts in the Middle East 
and North Africa region, shifting tourists to safer destinations like Spain. Furthermore, 
Exhibit 7 shows that the Spanish domestic tourism has seen a decrease between 2008 
and 2011, although it was probably linked to the financial crisis. 
Regarding the tourists accommodated in hotel establishments, its evolution is 
shown in the following graph: 
 
 The evolution of the number of people accommodated in hotels during the 
beginning of the 2000’s was positive but rather low, near 1 percent annually. Between 
2002 and 2005, the growth was higher, rounding 5 percent annually. The greatest 
growth during this decade happened between 2005 and 2006 with approximately 16 
percent. The following years were not as good – there was even a decrease between 
2007 and 2009, which was possibly connected with the crisis as mentioned previously.  
2010 and 2011 showed positive results, although at a slowing pace. It is relevant to 
mention here that the crisis was still affecting Spain and the demand of the hotel 
industry, given the government measures such as the VAT increases. 
On the supply side, it is noticed that the number of hotel establishments 
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Chart 1: Total number of people accommodated in hotels (in millions) 
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units – although there were some changes during that period of time. Exhibit 11 and the 
graph below shows precisely that: 
   
 It seems that there was some type of shock between 2001 and 2002 given its 
decline of 9 percent – although it is not described in the case, it is related perhaps to the 
September 11 attacks. After that year, the evolution of the number of hotels has been 
positive. However, this growth has been relatively low – an average of annual growth of 
1.16 percent between 2003 and 2011. Within this period of time, 2008 was the year of 
highest growth (about 3.3 percent). 
 The same analysis can be done to the number of available beds. In this case, the 
evolution was positive for all years between 1999 and 2011, with an average of annual 
growth of approximately 3 percent. The highest increase was seen between 2003 and 
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 Overall, the Spanish hotel industry is reaching the mature stage due to its 
slowing growth rates, though the performance of the industry was disrupted by the 
financial crisis. 
Although in a mature stage, new competitors may still be attracted into to the 
Spanish market. In fact, foreign chains even doubled its presence during 2011. 
Considering this fact with the low growth rates of new supply or installed capacity, it 
can be assumed and concluded that the level of concentration is becoming higher. In 
2011, the ten largest chains in terms of number of rooms concentrated 18 percent of the 
capacity of the hotels in Spain. Furthermore, it is mentioned in the case that only 30 
percent of the hotel establishments were managed by a hotel chain. Here, some 
opportunities may arise for them, once a large number of establishments (about 70 
percent) are expected to be more vulnerable to the crisis.  
Porter’s Five Forces: 
 Threat of new entrants 
According to the case, the overall growth in hotel capacity remained low in 2011 
compared to the previous year. According to Exhibit 11, the number of hotels only 
increased 1 percent during this period and number of available beds 2 percent. This 
means that some hotels increased its capacity, but it was not though a significant 
increase, and the latter percentages were even expected to decrease in the near future. 
Furthermore, it is required large financial resources in order to enter into the hotel 
industry, especially in the case of new companies, which consequently means that the 
threat of new supply is low in this sense.  
However, there is a difference between new supply and new companies entering 
in a market. In fact, there are many international hotel chains that are entering into 
Spain, taking over the management of existing hotel units. Here, the threat was higher. 
In addition, the trends in the market show that it does not necessarily require a big 
investment, given that there are business formats in which the investment is low. This 
happened mainly to management companies, the ones that take care of the operations.  
Taking into account all the elements, it can be considered that the threat of new 
entrance was moderate.  
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 Threat of substitute products or services 
According to the data from the case, there are substitutes for hotels. This is 
reflected for instance in the comparison of number of international tourists arrivals in 
Spain and the number of international tourists that were accommodated in hotels. Spain 
received in 2011 around 56.7 million international tourists as seen in the Exhibit 3, but 
only 39.5 were accommodated in hotels according to Exhibit 8, meaning that 
approximately 17.2 million (the difference between the two values), which represents 
about 30 percent of the international tourist arrivals, were accommodated in substitutes 
of the hotel establishments. 
Furthermore, this can also be shown in the domestic tourism data, although in 
this case the comparison is not as accurate because it is presented the number of trips of 
Spanish residents as apposed as the number of people who travel within Spain. Anyway, 
there were approximately 147 million trips in 2011 (Exhibit 7) and only about 45.8 
million Spanish residents stayed at hotels (Exhibit 8). 
This means that substitutes are present in the industry, otherwise tourist arrivals 
would match the number of people accommodated in hotels. The substitutes can be, for 
example, friends or family apartments and camping facilities, which are less expensive 
that hotels. However, the threat is rather low or moderate due the fact that tourists may 
not have access to some of these substitutes, for instance, family or friends dwelling. In 
the case of camping facilities, the customer profile is in practice different from hotel 
customers either because of the lifestyle or motive for the trip.  
 Bargaining power of buyers  
There are different types of customers or segments according to the motivation 
for the trip – leisure, business and MICE segments.  Within these segments, there are 
also differences between the international and domestic tourists.  
Overall, the number of customers is high, though an individual customer is small 
in size and losing a client is not that significant for a company, therefore, in this sense, 
the bargaining power of buyers is not strong once a single customer cannot drive down 
the price. Furthermore, although there is brand loyalty, the switching costs for 
customers are not significant. Besides, there are substitutes and many hotel brands in 
different categories.  
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However, it is mentioned in the case that tourist were looking even more for 
special discounts and special offers, and here, the bargaining power of customers may 
be higher. The unemployment rates and the VAT increases, among other factors, 
affected especially the Spanish domestic tourism once the Spanish residents were 
reducing and cutting costs such as leisure spending. Besides that, hotels may be forced 
to reduce its prices due to the increasing price sensitivity of business travelers and of 
MICE segment. 
 Bargaining power of suppliers 
There are many types of supplies: labor, real estate, furniture and machines, food 
and beverages, hotel utilities, technology advertising and other marketing services, 
consulting and legal services, among many others. 
Taken as a whole, there are many suppliers in the hotel industry although it is 
not explored in the case study. In addition, substitutability of the suppliers is also fairly 
possible and inexpensive. Therefore, the bargaining power of suppliers appears to be 
low.  
 Rivalry among existing competitors/Intensity of competitive rivalry 
The degree of competitive rivalry is high due to several factors.  
First of all, competition in the industry is determined essentially by price and 
segment and especially by proximity in terms of location (taken from the section of 
Relevant Theory). Competition by price is related in part to the category of the hotel. In 
other words, it is expected for a three-star hotel to compete with other three-star hotels, 
for example. However, if a four-star hotel decides to lower its prices or offer a price 
discount, it becomes a direct competitor of those three-star units, competing perhaps 
with other segments. Concerning the location, the competitors will be those that are 
closer. In such traditional and mature market as Spain, it is probable and expected for 
the most common destinations (Madrid, Barcelona or the Islands, for example) to have a 
fiercer competition.  
In addition, the growth of the number of hotels remained steady and low which 
may be another indicator, along with the fact that demand is much lower that the offer 
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according to the occupation rates in Exhibit 11 that indeed is a highly competitive 
industry.     
Then, the growing presence of international hotel chains in Spain was becoming 
more and more evident. In fact, these chains more than doubled its presence in 2011.  
 Conclusion about the attractiveness of the industry 
The industry seems to be driven especially by the rivalry among existing 
competitors. Considering all, the attractiveness appears to be medium.  
Opportunities and Threats: 
 Opportunities 
o Top ten countries in terms of international tourist spending and international 
tourist arrivals.  
o Third most popular congress and convention destination in the world in 
2011; the second country in the world in 2012 with more monuments 
classified as World Heritage Site, and the top golfing destination for 
European golfers. 
 Threats 
o The Spanish domestic tourism had been affected by the financial crisis and 
unemployment; the crisis can become an opportunity because prices of hotel 
establishments are expected to decrease.  
o Highly competitive market; it can also be considered an opportunity for 
establishing partnerships and alliances between hotel companies in order to 
combine resources to face other competitors. 
 
3. In your opinion, is it a good decision for Pestana Group to enter the Spanish 
market? 
 To answer this question, it is important firstly to understand whether if the 
country fits the Pestana’s criteria, although the company has already the objective of 
entering into the Spanish market. In the case (The Group’s Strategic Plans for the 
Future), it is presented the main criteria for the company to choose a market. These are: 
the dimension of the market, political and economic stability, legal clarity, good access 
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routes, security, and presence in other markets that emit tourists to the market in 
question.  
 Regarding the dimension of the market, Spain is one of the largest of the world, 
ranking in the fourth and second place in terms of international tourist arrivals and 
international tourist spending.  
As for the stability, it can be an issue for the company when it comes to the 
economic condition of Spain. The crisis and the difficulties of obtaining credit can 
become a significant problem for the company. However, prices of the hotel 
establishments are going down and the company has already been studying them, so it 
seems not to be a problem, although Dionísio actually mentioned that they are still high. 
Anyway, as a large hotel chain, it is apparently easier to obtain credit compared to 
smaller hotel chains, hotel companies in financial difficulties and independent hotels. 
Besides that, the company may explore other ways to enter into the Spanish market.   
Spain is one of the most competitive countries in the world, especially in the 
travel and tourism industry, in which it ranked in 2011 in the eighth position. According 
to the information given in the case, this ranking is based on several criteria like 
regulations, security and transport infrastructure, among others. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that that the Spanish market fits the requirements of legal clarity, good access 
routes and security. For the latter criterion, it can be added that the 2010/2011 growth in 
international tourist arrivals was due to the conflicts in the Middle East and North of 
Africa. Therefore, these tourists considered Spain as a safe destination.  
As for the last criterion (the presence in other markets that emit tourists to the 
Spanish market), it can be understood from the comparison between the countries in 
which Pestana is present and the Spanish inbound tourism. The Group has hotels in 
thirteen different countries: Portugal, Brazil, England, Germany, Argentina, Venezuela, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Colombia, the United 
States and Morocco.  
According to Exhibit 5, the international tourists who arrived to Spain in 2011 
accounted for 56,694,298 people, out of which more than 90 percent came from other 
European countries. The most important were: the United Kingdom, Germany, France, 
Italy, Netherlands and Belgium, which together accounted for approximately 70 percent 
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of the inbound tourism.  Out of these countries, Pestana is present in two of them: the 
United Kingdom and Germany. However, in these countries, the Group has only one 
unit in each (London and Berlin), so its presence it is not as strong. In fact, the only 
European country in which Pestana has a strong presence is Portugal, having hotels 
across the main destinations under two brands (Pestana Hotels & Resorts and Pousadas 
de Portugal). Still, Portugal represented in 2011 just 3.2 percent of the Spanish inbound, 
and besides, the total number of Portuguese tourists arrived in Spain has decreased 5.7 
percent comparing with the previous year.  
Pestana should also consider the attractiveness of the industry when deciding 
whether should enter into the Spanish market or not. Therefore, this point will depend 
on what students may have answered in Question 2. As mentioned in the previous 
question, the hotel industry is characterized by being highly competitive, which is a big 
threat. But Pestana has the experience, and if a good opportunity emerges, it seems to be 
a good option for the company to enter in Spain.  
4. In what ways can Pestana benefit from the entrance in the Spanish market? 
First of all, being considered the Portuguese largest hotel chain and having a 
strong presence in this market, it is expected to be known by the Portuguese population. 
Furthermore, according to Exhibit 9, 1,214,535 Portuguese tourists were 
accommodated in hotels in Spain in 2011. Although its growth was relatively low (3.07 
percent), Portugal still represented the sixth emitting country to the Spanish hotel 
industry in that year. For that reason, it is possible for Pestana to acquire some of these 
Portuguese tourists if it enters the Spanish market, given that a person is more likely to 
stay in a hotel if its brand is known.  
Then, it would be a way to increase the brand awareness and recognition among 
tourists and residents. Therefore, Pestana can gain more customers (residents in Spain 
or from other countries) in other countries where it is present. For example, according to 
Exhibit 7, the major destinations for Spanish residents in 2011 were France (18 percent 
of the total Spanish outbound tourism), Portugal (12 percent), the United Kingdom (9 
percent) and Germany (6 percent) – and Pestana has units in the three last countries (23 
across Portugal, 1 in London and 1 in Berlin). Furthermore, South America represented 
8 percent of the outbound tourism, where the company has several hotels and is 
planning to further invest.  
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5. What are the possible modes of entry in Spain? What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of those strategies? 
INVESTEMENT-BASED 
 Ownership (or wholly owned subsidiaries): 
It is a common business format in Spain as mention in the case, especially in the 
case of national hotel chains, in which the unit is owned and operated by the same 
organization. Actually, it is also the predominant format of Pestana hotels once it owns 
and operates the units, with some particular exceptions like Pestana Casablanca in 
Morocco. However, owner-run hotels are losing popularity in Spain because it requires 
a high commitment of capital and resources, and credit is getting harder to obtain. In 
addition, due the economic and financial context of the Spanish market, it is not easy to 
obtain credit from the banks. Besides, the company has to bear the risk from borrowing, 
if it is the case. Perhaps the largest hotel chains can obtain it but they are actually 
changing its business model and focus more on management contracts, franchising 
agreements and other strategies that require low capital outflow. 
On the other hand, some opportunities arose as the price of the hotel units 
decreased given the financial crisis, especially in urban hotels in Madrid and Barcelona. 
Furthermore, Pestana has already been analyzing the prices of some hotels in difficult, 
although Dionísio stated that they have not fallen enough. So, perhaps, Pestana should 
wait if they decide for this format, because the company has internally established a 
limit for its debt. In contrast, if Pestana chooses another business format that requires 
low capital, it can contract debt in other markets like South America, in which might be 
easier to obtain credit, and still comply with that maximum debt limit.   
The advantages and disadvantages of finance leases
37
 are identical, once this type 
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 In the case, it is mentioned leasing as a business format. It is important to mention that there are two 
types of leases: finance and operating leases. The first transfers all the risks and rewards to the tenant, 
while in the second, they remain with the landlord. 
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 Joint Ventures 
A joint venture is the cooperation or partnership of two or more companies in 
which both share rewards and risks, involving shareholding. One example is the joint 
venture between AC Hotels and Marriott International, establishing a co-branding 
strategy, after the acquisition of 50 percent of the Spanish company by Marriott.  
 The advantage may include the synergies between the companies through the 
combination of resources, expertise and distribution channels – and in the latter 
example, the combination of strong brand names. As for the drawbacks, some conflicts 
may occur due to disagreements between the parties.  
CONTRACT-BASED 
 Management contracts:  
Management contracts are agreements or business formats between the 
establishment owner and a hotel management company, separating therefore ownership 
from operations. There is no official definition of management contracts but usually the 
owner retains the financial and legal responsibility of the property and the management 
company operates the hotel, pays hotel expenses and receives a settled fee, although it 
depends on the conditions of the contract.  
 It is actually a good business format for moments of crisis, once it requires low 
capital commitment. However, there may be less flexibility in management decisions 
and there may be conflicts between the owner and the management company. 
 The advantages and drawbacks of operating leases
38
 are similar due to the fact 
that these leases do not convey the rights of ownership to the hotel company.  
 Franchise agreements:  
It is business format in which a company gives the right for using its brand to 
other company in exchange for a fee. There are no capital requirements and it is a way 
for a company to rapidly expand its brand. However, there is lack of control from the 
franchisor, although the franchisee has to guarantee certain requirements. 
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types of leases: finance and operating leases. The first transfers all the risks and rewards to the tenant, 
while in the second, they remain with the landlord. 
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 Strategic Alliances 
Strategic alliances are mentioned in the case and can also be considered an entry 
mode as well. For example, it is the case of the alliance between Pestana and Rewe 
Touristik. The German Group became responsible for the distribution in several 
countries (Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Benelux) of two of Pestana hotels, 
establishing also a co-branding strategy between Pestana and LTI (one of Rewe’s 
brands): LTI Pestana Grand Hotel and LTI Pestana Viking Hotel, being both managed 
by Pestana. Before this alliance, Rewe Touristik did not have or manage any hotel units 
in Portugal and, therefore, this case of strategic alliance can be understood as another 
type of entry mode. From Rewe’s point of view, the advantages and disadvantages of 
this strategy are similar to franchising agreements. 
6. How could Pestana benefit from a strategic alliance in the Spanish market? 
Should Pestana try to pursue this strategy? 
The benefits will vary depending on the type of strategic alliance and the type of 
company that Pestana would partner with. For answering this question, students may 
take again the example of the alliance between Pestana and Rewe Touristik presented 
above. If Pestana adopts a co-branding strategy in Spain with a local hotel chain, the 
benefits would embed a greater exposure of its brand in the market and a much lower 
risk comparing to a situation where Pestana enters with no alliance or co-branding 
strategy. Regarding whether Pestana should pursue this strategy or not, it will depend on 
the level of control the company wants to take on. The fact is that Pestana manages all 
the units that are under its brand and has never followed a franchising strategy, which 
may indicate that the company wants to have certain control of its units and brand. If 
indeed that is the case, one way of benefiting from co-branding is to establish a co-
management agreement as well.  
But there are other types of alliances that do not include co-branding and that 
would be useful for Pestana. For instance, the Spanish hotel chain Meliá International 
Hotels signed a sales and operations agreement with the Chinese Jin Jiang International 
Hotel Company, in which both parties partnered in order to cooperate in the expansion 
of Meliá throughout China and of Jin Jiang in Europe. Besides this, it is also common 
for hotel companies or chains to partner with other types of companies like restaurants, 
tour operators, travel agencies, among others.  
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7. If eventually Pestana enters the Spanish market, what should its strategy be?  
Students may think about the key success factors of the Spanish hotel industry in 
order to formulate the strategy of the company, along with other possible factors.  
One of the criteria for the company to choose a country is the presence in other 
markets that emit tourists to the country in question. Possibly, this criterion may refer to 
the awareness and recognition of the brand in different markets. Giving an example, 
Spain receives many tourists from the United Kingdom. Although Pestana has only one 
unit in London, this can create brand awareness and recognition among the English 
residents and the English tourists that visit Spain. Therefore, if the Group enters Spain, 
it should use its brand as it has done over the years and not create a new one.  
Furthermore, given the condition of the Spanish market, the best options of 
mode of entry would be management contracts, although Pestana is also looking for 
acquisition and ownership opportunities. It would be an easier way of expansion, related 
also with one of the industry’s key success factors: size and number of rooms. If an 
opportunity emerges, it would also be a good option to make an alliance with a Spanish 
hotel chain, rather small or medium because it may be more difficult with larger ones, 
and explore co-branding strategies.  
In addition, its core business focuses on four and five-star hotels, and is also 
considering entering the three-star category. Therefore, other categories can be 
excluded. Nonetheless, the company must consider that there is a risk, if it indeed enters 
the three-star category, of damaging the quality perception in other markets. Besides 
this, it is important to consider that in 2011, more than 74 percent of the tourists 
accommodated in hotels stayed at three and four-star hotels, units that presented the 
higher occupation rates (Exhibit 8). In any case, Pestana should establish competitive 
prices due to the fact that it is a highly competitive industry, taking into account the 
average daily rates – the ADR that were presented in the case study were €148, €78 and 
€58 for five, four and three hotels.       
 Then, other key success factors are quality management commitment that 
includes, for example, leadership, quality planning, people management, customer 
focus, process management, supplier management, continuous improvement and 
product design, as referred in the Relevant theory. Pestana has already the knowledge 
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experience, whether in four or five-star hotels. In addition, given the geographical 
proximity to Portugal, it may benefit from current supplier relationships when it comes 
to the Spanish market.  
Distribution channels and communication are also essential. As mentioned 
before, Pestana has an agreement for the distribution of two units in the Portuguese 
market with Rewe Touristik. Perhaps, it should explore also the opportunity of 
establishing other type of alliance or agreement with the German Group regarding the 
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